Abstract. Decentralized systems can be more resistant to operator mischief than centralized ones, but they are substantially harder to develop, deploy, and maintain. This cost is dramatically reduced if the decentralized part of the system can be made highly generic, and thus incorporated into many different applications. We show how existing anonymization systems can serve this purpose, securing a public database against equivocation by its operator without the need for cooperation by the database owner. We derive bounds on the probability of successful equivocation, and in doing so, we demonstrate that anonymization systems are not only important for user privacy, but that by providing privacy to machines they have a wider value within the internet infrastructure.
Introduction
Suppose you want to call someone, but do not know their phone number. How do you find it? The obvious way is to look them up in a phone book, but the phone company might have placed a different address under their name. If they are particularly security conscious, then you might presume that, when they received their phone book, they checked to see whether their number is correctly listed. But what if it were not modified in every phone book, but some contain the real number and some contain a false one?
The authentication of database entries and user attributes is an important problem in information security; one of the most prominent applications is in keydistribution for end-to-end secure messaging. Some systems use centralized keydistribution services, placing trust in the operators of their servers. Others use decentralized methods, but existing methods come with their own limitations; the public-key infrastructure allows most certificate authorities to impersonate anyone, and mainstream blockchain systems waste power calculating proofs of work. The result is that even when a database can be realistically distributed, the designers of many systems choose not to do so.
This task is greatly simplified if we can decentralize a system in a generic way, adding standard components that can be reused for many systems. We show in Sections 2 and 3 that an anonymization system serves this purpose, in many cases without modification or even the cooperation of the central server.
Our contribution in this paper is to show that a variation of the multi-path probing [1] approach used by DetecTor [2] is provably secure. Users simultaneously make identical requests to a central service via an anonymizer. If they receive consistent responses, then they can assure themselves that the server provides identical responses to identical requests; we show in Section 3.4 that a server can successfully equivocate across N users for M rounds with probability at most N 1−M . This approach has a number of advantages over other anti-equivocation techniques in the literature:
-No bootstrapping problem. By using an existing anonymity system to audit quite general services, new systems can obtain the benefits of distributed auditing without an existing community to provide operator-diverse monitoring systems. -Scalability. Users do not need to communicate with each other, except to signal that the service has misbehaved. As a result, the communication overhead is only O (log ) for a given security level . -Computational efficiency. Because we do not use a proof-of-work system, no computational power is wasted on what is generally pointless busywork whose only purpose is to make participation costly. This is relevant to our first point: a new proof-of-work system is not secure until it has enough miners to out-compute any potential attacker. This creates a chicken-and-egg problem, in that the system is not secure until it is widely adopted, which will not happen if it is insecure. -No server-side cooperation needed. This approach does not require any changes on the server-side; as a result, it is quite practical for motivated users to audit existing services without the need for effort or cooperation from their operators.
The first of these points is particularly important, as many pieces of software begin as a small-scale project by individuals or groups without third-party commitment. Our protocol provides a distributed auditing capability that has until now been completely unavailable to such projects.
Motivation
Our principal motivation for the development of this auditing method is to allow the use of centralized key-distribution servers in a secure manner. Key distribution is a difficult problem to solve, and as it stands there are few solutions that do not centralize trusted operations to a significant degree, requiring manual verification on the part of users in order to eliminate the risks posed by malicious infrastructure operators. The need for manual effort is problematic in multiple ways; the first is that most users will simply not bother, but even amongst those users who do make the effort, they will not necessarily wait for the verification to take place before communicating. This leaves a window of vulnerability before an attack is detected, which in the case of manual in-person verification may be very long indeed.
Our desire, then, is to allow users to take responsibility for the security of their own identity to the greatest extent possible, but in a way that does not require a significant degree of manual effort.
Public-key distribution: the status quo
The most widely-accepted systems that are configured by end-users, such as Secure Shell (SSH) [3] and WhatsApp [4] , tend to use a trust-on-first-use [1] model, in which initial communication takes place with either no or only manual authentication, after which the the user is alerted to key changes. However, this does not prove the identity of the user unless the two parties use some out-ofband authentication method.
This can be overcome by standards such as X.509 [5] , which use signed certificates to verify identities: X.509 is widely adopted by email clients, but the need to acquire certificates from a commercial certificate authority has prevented it from seeing any significant use; in addition, most certificate authorities can issue certificates for anyone in the world, an ability that has been abused on a number of occasions both by attackers and the operators of the authorities. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [6] aims to provide message-level security to the masses, but has been hampered by the difficulty of its key management, which depends upon personal contact to establish trust relationships.
Identity-based cryptography provides another approach, in which trust in a key needs only be established at the organizational level rather than between individual users, but this allows access to private keys by service providers; the ubiquity of adversaries with coercive powers and an interest in mass surveillance means that this is entirely inadequate from a privacy standpoint. While the risk might be mitigated with the aid of threshold cryptosystems or other distributed approaches, if the desire to decrypt a user's communications exists at an organizational level then threshold decryption and secret sharing provides little protection to users.
Related work
The problem of obtaining agreement on a value amongst several-possibly malicioususers is an old one, known as the Byzantine Generals problem, and was first analyzed by Lamport et al. in 1982 [7] . Several officers plan for an attack, in which they must act simultaneously in order to be successful. This is complicated by the knowledge that some of the officers may be traitors-including the general in command of all of them-and may therefore send different messages to different units in an effort to induce a doomed attack.
Consensus protocols have seen increasing prominence in recent years with the rise of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin [8] , whose security against doublespending depends upon public scrutiny of the submitted transactions. If consensus on the transaction ledger is broken-that is to say, if different users see different values-different transaction records can be sent to different users, allowing double-spending to occur.
Traditional consensus protocols Traditional consensus-based approaches [9] are effective, but typically do not scale well to large numbers of participants [10] . Significantly, they require communication channels between many of the nodes taking part in the consensus protocol, with resistance to traitors being limited by the connectivity of the network graph. This is inconvenient in practice, as it requires individual clients to discover and communicate with large numbers of independent nodes, and requiring a large community in the first place in order to bootstrap the network, since additional nodes controlled by the same operator make the system less secure as it increases the number of traitorous nodes if the the operator is malicious.
Proof-of-work protocols The Bitcoin protocol [8] prevents the consensus from being split by requiring a proof-of-work in order for the transaction to be published, hash-linked to the previous state of the ledger. This functions somewhat analogously to a voting system, with the state of the ledger being collectively determined by whichever group has the most computational power.
This type of protocol has the advantage over classical protocols [11] of not requiring large amounts of communication amongst the users in question. For example, the algorithm presented in [11] requires a message count that is O N 2 in the number of users.
A disadvantage of the proof-of-work approach is the need for popularity-the security of proof-of-work-based systems comes from the expense of performing enough computation to compete with the rest of the network, meaning that smaller projects will initially be completely controlled by their founders, and even after the appearance of independent miners, they will be vulnerable for some time to the sudden appearance of an adversary with large amounts of computing power. Furthermore, the computation of these proofs-of-work requires large amounts of power, making the scheme rather inefficient.
Collective signing An alternative method has recently been proposed that uses collective signing [12, 13] . This allows consensus to be efficiently demonstrated by collectively-generated digital signatures. If the consensus group is known in advance, then this allows us to ensure that the entire group has accepted the same piece of data.
Knowledge of the group members is a potential problem; in [13] , where the collective signing approach was applied to Bitcoin, group membership is given to those who have recently mined a block, taking advantage of the proof-of-work system to prevent Sybil attacks.
Without a proof-of-work system, some other transparent way of determining who will be invited to take part in the collective signature process is necessary. Nonetheless, such an approach will prove effective, if the necessary infrastructure comes into being.
The primary disadvantage of this approach is the need for dedicated verification infrastructure; this creates a bootstrapping problem when new types of verification are needed. Nonetheless, this may be overcome for verification tasks such as domain verification that have wide commercial appeal.
Multi-path probing Our proposed technique is a special case of multi-path probing. Multi-path probing involves accessing a service from several points of view in order to detect local variations in responses such as caused a man-inthe-middle attack located far from the service in question.
The first such system was Perspectives [1] . This system uses a number of notary servers, which scan publicly-accessible web services for keys. By doing so regularly, they obtain a record of a service's public-key history, and thus allowing users to convince themselves that the server has not changed its public key recently. By accessing multiple such notaries, they can see the key as it appears from several network perspectives. This reduces the risk posed by a malicious notary. Unfortunately, much of this functionality depends upon knowledge of the protocol in use, so that the public key can be extracted. This means that new services cannot be audited with Perspectives until they have developed a following sufficient to justify their support by a large number of notary servers.
A simpler approach, and the direct inspiration for our scheme, is implemented by DoubleCheck [14] . When connecting to a server, DoubleCheck makes a second connection via Tor, which it uses to acquire a copy of its certificate. This certificate is compared with that obtained via the direct connection, and the user is warned if they do not match. The same approach is used by DetecTor [2] , which is notable for suggesting that operators use it to verify the state of their own servers.
The CONIKS [15] directory system, includes a Perspectives-like scheme in its architecture, going so far as to include bounds on the probability of successful equivocation by a given number of malicious auditors. Their analysis is related to a special case of our own, but crucially assumes the existence of independent auditors who store and distribute their signed tree roots. This allows clients to see the database from multiple viewpoints, but creates a bootstrapping problem.
Our contribution is to demonstrate that it is possible to design an antiequivocation system like that proposed for CONIKS without dedicated auditing systems. We describe a DetecTor-like system whose consensus is provably secure, relative to the sender anonymity of the anonymization system in use.
Verification protocol
Suppose that Bob wishes to acquire a piece of information from an untrusted anonymously-accessed service, and Alice the auditor can detect whether a given response from the server is valid. The protocol that we propose is as follows:
1. At a predetermined time, Alice and Bob both request a copy of the message from the service. We show this in Figure 1 . Clients who see evidence of equivocation know that the service is untrustworthy, and can report its misbehavior. If the responses are signed, these clients can prove to third parties that the server has equivocated, providing a substantial deterrent to misbehavior on the part of the service. Fig. 1 . Interpretation of the results obtained from the protocol. Clients that have not received consistent responses from the server reject the response from the server, which they know to be faulty. Clients that have consistently received the same response accept it as unequivocated. In this figure, the server has equivocated, with the third and fourth clients being unaware of the fact and the others detecting the misbehavior of the service.
Any anonymizing system can be used for this protocol, but in general synchronized system such as a mix-net will be more effective, as these provide littleto-no room for timing attacks. In practice, low-latency anonymization networks such as Tor are far more available than mix-nets; we discuss the methods used to close the timing side-channel attacks in Appendix A.
Security Analysis
There are many anonymizing systems in use, the most popular by far being Tor [16] . One of the goals of Tor is to prevent users from being deanonymized over the long term [16] . This is a reasonable target, given that one of Tor's stated purposes is the protection of dissidents and journalistic sources from statelevel adversaries. Compromizing a single request over the course of many years might well result in catastrophic consequences for the user; even if that single request does not contain any compromising information, it may tie them to a pseudonym-e.g. a social media account whose activities are known. As an example of this, the head of the hacking group LulzSec was arrested after connecting to an online chat server on just a single occasion without using Tor [17] .
Our requirements are different-whereas a dissident, leaker, or criminal desires to minimize the probability that they will ever be deanonymized, our desire is to minimize the probability that an individual request is deanonymized, since the security of the design that we will describe shortly is determined by the number of requests that can be made without being connected to one another. We will discuss this distinction in greater detail in Section 3.2, but it is important to highlight that what we describe is only one of many possible definitions of anonymity that has been chosen to meet our needs.
Definitions
We begin by defining some notation. We consider a set of users U = {U 1 , . . . , U N } who take part in the protocol above. This is our anonymity set.
We write the set of injections from A into B as Inj(A → B), and bijections from A to B as Bij(A → B).
These users connect to a service via an anonymizer, all making identical requests. We model this process in Figure 2 . The anonymizer makes a request to the adversary on behalf of the clients, providing partial information on which response will go to which user.
Adversary model
We define our security relative to the security of an anonymity system, and in particular to the notion of sender anonymity as defined by Pfitzmann and Köntopp [18] , and loosely follow the formalisation given by Backes et al. [19] , but extended to N simultaneous users and M request-response rounds. We select this definition because it provides the most direct route to our statistical quantities of interest; this type of definition can be related to indistinguishability-based definitions such as those by Backes et al. in a straightforward manner [19] .
Definition 1 (Sender-anonymous service).
Suppose a set of users U = {U 1 , . . . , U N } each make a series of M identical and synchronous requests to a service via an anonymizer, receiving a response, as in Figure 2 .
Then, consider the experiment in Figure 3 for any adversary A, with the leakage function L being a system parameter. We call the combination of anonymization system and service -sender-anonymous, ≥ 0, if for all adversaries A,
/ / Select request identifiers by random assignment.
RI(·)
/ / The adversary provides a response for / / each request number
/ / Return the response identifiers and values.
return RI(·), RV(·) Fig. 2 . A model of an anonymously-accessed service, where A is the potentiallymalicious service, and L is a leakage function that captures the information leaked to the adversary. In the case of Tor, for example, L is the user-to-request mapping RI with its domain restricted to users whose entry guards are surveilled by the attacker. The service accepts a set of users, and selects a random mapping from users to request identifiers. The adversary is given system-dependent partial information on the source of each request, and invited to provide a response to each request.
This definition assumes that all users operate in lockstep, masking their identities by making identical requests with covert channels sufficiently masked that the probability of successfully linking consecutive requests is no better than chance. We use a multiplicative parameter 1 + rather than an additive one because this simplifies the analysis to follow; the same results hold with an additive parameter + = N ! .
The most straightforward way to achieve this is the mix-net [20] , where a chain of hosts, called mixes, re-encrypt and shuffle fixed-sized messages, guaranteeing anonymity so long as at least one member of the chain is honest. The anonymity set here is the set {U i } of users who take part in the protocol.
From our perspective, this means that the adversary is unable respond so in such a way as to target a particular user with a particular response. Whether the adversary has compromised the service or is performing a man-in-the-middle attack is immaterial; all we require is that they cannot deanonymize the requests in time to send messages tailored to a particular user.
In some systems this is proven with respect to particular computational hardness assumptions [21] , whereas other systems such as Tor are ad-hoc [22] and will fall to a global passive adversary. Our approach is implicitly conditional upon whichever assumptions are made by the underlying anonymization system; should a provably-secure alternative to Tor become equally widespread, it will serve just as well.
EXP-SAL,U,M (A).
/ / Prime the adversary with M − 1 anonymous requests.
/ / Let the adversary identify a response identifier for each user. . Security experiment for sender-anonymity. An anonymity system, defined by its leakage function L, is used to make requests to an adversary who aims provide particular messages to particular users. The adversary is asked to determine the users to whom each of its responses were sent; it wins if it correctly identifies all of the recipients.
R(·)
There exists the possibility that an attacker might use a denial-of-service to prevent an individual user from accessing the server, if the attacker is able to identify the link that they use to connect to the anonymizing service. Defeating this type of attack is outside the scope of this paper, however we note that it will always be recognized as a fault by the user in question and reported as such.
While this definition makes clear the capabilities of the adversary, it is not ideal for calculation. We will thus make extensive use of the following theorem: Theorem 1. Consider the protocol from Section 2 with N users, where the anonymizing service is a synchronous -sender-anonymous service, as in Definition 1. Then, for any adversary A with arbitrary knowledge of the recipients of the previous messages, the recipients of responses 1, . . . , N are approximately uniformly distributed over Bij(Z N → U), with each of the N ! mappings from responses to recipients occuring with probability at most (N !)
Proof. Consider an arbitrary round of requests in the described protocol. We note that the security experiment in Figure 3 mirrors steps one to three of the protocol, with the function R I (·) representing the response destinations for the round under consideration. Thus, by our assumption of -sender-anonymity, the adversary can predict all of the response destinations with probability at most
We now proceed by contradiction. Suppose the adversary can act in such a way that some response-user mapping R : Z N → U occurs with probability greater than (N !) −1 (1 + ). Then, in Figure 3 , the adversary can select this mapping as their predictionR : Z N → U of the message destinations. By supposition, this is is correct with a probability greater than (N !) −1 (1 + ), in contradiction of Definition 1, yielding the desired contradiction.
We note that when = 0, this implies that the recipients of each message are perfectly uniformly distributed.
It is this mixing property that we use to provide security. Any response sent by the service will be received with equal probability by all of its users, and thus it is impossible to reliably provide auditors with a different set of records without defeating the anonymizer.
We also posit the existence of some global channel that allows a user to warn others that a fault has occurred, and that the adversary cannot block. We argue that this is a legitimate assumption, since failures can be provided to thirdparty reporting services or, if all else fails, manually sent via email to a public mailing list. If the server signs and time-stamps its responses, its misbehavior is non-repudiable, thus preventing false-positives from being used to flood the channel.
Probability of discord between pairs of users
In our analysis, we consider two separate scenarios. First, that where one user wishes to verify the details of another without trusting that others clients will inform them of inconsistencies in the responses. This is the case with many legacy systems, for example data from PGP keyservers or arbitrary websites, as it is reasonable to assume that one might be the only person attempting to verify the details of any particular user at any given moment.
In the second scenario, the service acts like a traditional broadcaster-many users attempt to access the same data, for example a Merkle tree root for Certificate Transparency, CONIKS, or Bitcoin. In this case we may assume that a certain number of users are active in the protocol and able to publicly report failures-for widely-distributed software, it is implausible that there would not be at least a few hundred or thousand active users at any given time-allowing misbehaviour to be detected with a yet-higher probability.
We start by considering the first case, where a given user is isolated from the other users as in Figure 1 . Suppose N users each make M identical requests to the sender-anonymous service. It responds with K copies of one message x, and N − K copies of another message x . These destinations of these messages will be uniformly distributed over the set of users, as shown in Theorem 1.
We begin by justifying our use of only two messages, x and x . Lemma 1. When the described protocol is run with more than two users, the maximum probability of successful equivocation occurs when only two values are transmitted.
Proof. Suppose the service can transmit values {x, x , x , . . .}. Then, for any choice of responses, if x , x , . . . are replaced by x , every sequence of responses that do not trigger a failure by any set of users will still be accepted by those users. Thus the maximum probability of successful equivocation is achieved by a service transmitting only the true value x and a single false value x .
This lemma is useful when bounding the probability of acceptance, as it permits us to consider only two possible responses. The goal of the attacker, then, is that some users receive one response value every time, and and others receive the other response value each time. Should Definition 1 hold, this is exceedingly unlikely, as we show in Lemma 3.
The analysis is eased substantially if we consider a perfect anonymization system-that is, with = 0-for which the process of responding to the anonymous requests with one of two responses is readily modelled by the process of pulling coloured balls from an urn. In this analogy, the response x is represented by a white ball, and x by a black one; the balls are drawn from the urn without replacement, yielding the probability of a particular set of responses over the entire set of users.
We begin by showing how a probability bound calculated with respect to a 0-sender-anonymous service can be loosened in order to apply to an -senderanonymous service.
Lemma 2 (Imperfect anonymizer correction.). Let E be some event taken over the sample space of N ! M message→recipient mappings for an -senderanonymous service with N users over M rounds, and Pr [E ] be the probability that E occurs given some such service. Then,
where Pr 0 [E ] is the probability that E occurs given a uniform distribution of mappings.
Proof. Let us first consider an individual outcome
where the r i ∈ Bij(Z N → U) are the response destinations for round i. The event {r} in which the outcome r occurs may then be written
where
With a uniform probability measure Pr 0 [·], r occurs with probability N ! −M . With our adversary-degraded probability measure Pr [·], r will occur with probability
which Theorem 1 bounds by
As the probability space is finite, we may write any event E as a disjoint finite union
and thus
the statement that we set out to prove.
With this lemma in hand, we may bound the probability of any failure event as though the anonymity of the users is perfect, applying a multiplicative factor (1 + )
M after the fact in order to account for the imperfect nature of the anonymization system. This is convenient for our calculations, because the probabilities of our events of interest can then be easily determined by straightforward coloured-balls-in-an-urn calculations.
Lemma 3. Suppose N users take part in the described protocol exactly once, including a particular pair of users Alice and Bob. The service provides K copies of the message x, and N − K copies of a message x . Then, Bob will receive the value x and Alice the value x with probability
Proof. Where the service satisfies -sender-anonymity with = 0, the recipients of the responses are uniformly distributed and thus this problem is equivalent to that as that of pulling balls from an urn: given an urn containing K white balls and N − K black balls, acceptance is equivalent to drawing first a white ballprobability K/N -and then a black ball-probability (N − K)/(N − 1)-resulting in a joint probability of
Application of Lemma 2 yields the original expression for arbitrary security parameters 0 ≤ .
Theorem 2 (Probability of specific failure modes).
Suppose N users take part in the described protocol with a sender-anonymous service, including Alice and Bob. Then, after M iterations Alice will accept the value x and Bob the value x with probability at most
Proof. We first consider the case where = 0. In order for Bob to accept a false value without detection by Alice, the service must succeed all M times in sending x to Alice and some other value x to Bob. Lemma 1 indicates that the maximum probability of success occurs when only a single false value is emitted, so we assume that all responses are either x or x . Suppose that in round i, the service responds K i times with x and N − K i times with x . The probability that Alice receives x and Bob x is given by Lemma 3 as
and the probability of Bob accepting the false value without Alice noticing is therefore
This is maximized by setting
when N is odd, K i can be rounded in either direction by the attacker-rounding up is more likely to result in the true value being accepted, whereas rounding down increases the likelihood of rejection.
The maximum probability of a successful attack is therefore
As Alice and Bob are unaware of the number of other users accessing the service, they must assume the worst-case value; this occurs when, N = 2 yielding p decep ≤ 2 −M . As the number of users increases, the bound will approach 4 −M ; we note again that this is the probability of false acceptance for a single pair of users, and so does not take into account the possibility that other users will detect the substitution and report it publicly.
Theorem 2 provides an important quantity that is directly applicable to the security of a directory service: the maximum probability that the service can deceive a user looking up a piece of information without being noticed by a single auditor. We can view this from another point of view, namely the probability of breaking the consensus between pairs of nodes. The essential difference is that Theorem 2 does not consider a broken consensus to be a failure if Alice accepts the value x, even if Bob receives a copy of x and so reports misbehavior, despite the service having successfully broken the consensus.
Theorem 3 (Probability of pairwise discord). Suppose N users take part in the described protocol, including Alice and Bob. Then, after M rounds Alice and Bob will accept distinct values with probability at most
Proof. We first consider the case where = 0, proceeding as follows: first, we calculate the probability that Alice and Bob will receive different values in the initial round, then we apply Theorem 2 to calculate the maximum probability that they will both receive these initial values for the remainder of the protocol. Suppose that in the first round of the protocol, the server responds with K 1 copies of the value z and N − K 1 copies of the value z . Then, the probability that Alice and Bob will receive different values is the probability of receiving z and z respectively, or z and z. As these events are disjoint, this probability is equal to
by Lemma 3. Let us denote the value received by Alice x and that received by Bob x . Then, by Theorem 2, the probability of that the remaining M − 1 rounds will result in Alice receiving only the value x and Bob x is at most
yielding an overall consensus-breaking probability of
This is maximized by setting K 1 = [N/2] and thus
The probability of undetectably breaking the consensus between any pair of nodes thus falls exponentially with time, never being greater than 2 1−M .
Probability of undetected consensus-breaking
We now take a more global view, and calculate the probability that the service can equivocate without being detected by any of its users. Where trustworthy reporting infrastructure exists to allow the publication of equivocation reports to all of the users of the service, this is the applicable probability of failure. Furthermore, from the point of view of the attacker or malicious service operator, this is the probability that their attack will be detected, and thus the most important consideration from a deterrance point of view. The service may attempt to mislead as before, but the difficulty of achieving global acceptance increased by the need to provide consistent responses to all users.
Theorem 4 (Detection of consensus splits). Suppose N users take part in the described protocol, and the attacker provides the response x to K users and x = x to N − K users. If this is repeated over M rounds, the probability that the attacker will succeed in providing M N consistent responses to all N users over all M rounds is
Proof. We first consider the case where = 0. By Theorem 1, responses to an anonymous service are randomly assigned to users. There exist N K ways to assign the K false responses amongst the N users, and the attacker must do so identically to the first round for each of the M − 1 subsequent or they will be detected.
Note that K must be the same for each round, otherwise at least one user will recognize the deception.
This results in a non-detection probability of
Application of Lemma 2 yields the original expression for arbitrary security parameters 0 ≤ . This probability is maximized by setting K as far from N/2 as possible. That is to say, a well-behaved (or consistently misbehaving) service will respond consistently with probability 1, and the maximum probability of breaking the consensus between the users is N 1−M , achieved by providing identical responses to all but a single user each round.
In addition to consistency checking, an attacker must contend with users who have the ability to check the validity of their responses directly. Should one of these auditors receive the false value x directly, they can immediately raise the alarm.
Corollary 1.
If an auditor having knowledge of the true value x takes part in the protocol, then the probability of successfully deceiving K out of N users-N including the auditor-without detection by anyone is
Proof. We first consider the case where = 0. We add an additional success criterion to Theorem 4. As well as responding consistently to each user, the service must respond to the auditor with the value x in the first round. This occurs with probability (N − K)/N , and we multiply by the result stated in Theorem 4 to obtain the result above. Application of Lemma 2 yields the original expression for arbitrary security parameters 0 ≤ .
Theorem 5.
The maximum probability of deceiving without detection any member of a group of N users, amongst them an auditor, who follow the protocol above for M rounds is
Proof. We first consider the case where = 0. The value of p decep above is that given by Corollary 1 with K = 1. We are only interested in the case where K > 0, since otherwise none of the group have been deceived, and with K < N , since then the auditor will detect the false message with probability one. We write the bound from Corollary 1
and hypothesizing that the maximum occurs when K = 1, we calculate
Since 0 < K < N , both of these terms are at most one, and thus p s [K] attains its maximum at K = 1, yielding the formula above, for = 0. Application of Lemma 2 yields the original expression for arbitrary security parameters 0 ≤ .
This demonstrates the difficulty of surreptitiously breaking the consensus between users shielded by an anonymizer. As before the probability of consensusbreaking falls rapidly with protocol iterations, but this time the probability of deception approaches zero-admittedly only polynomially-as the number of users increases.
Anonymization methods
The question of how to perform the anonymization is not as straightforward as it might first appear. The simplest way is to use a mix-net, as this naturally provides the lock-step behaviour that we have assumed in our analysis. However, this infrastructure is not widely available, and so we briefly turn our attention to more widely-deployed systems that might prove equally useful.
We use Tor in our prototype on account of its wide availability; in addition to its large deployed capacity and mature software, its diversity of relay operators renders systemic failure less likely than with a smaller-scale system intended specifically for our protocol.
Rather than transmitting batches of messages in lock-step, as a mix-net does, Tor immediately forwards its received messages-termed onions for their layers of encryption-to the following relay or, if they are the last in the routing chain, to their destination. This reduces the latency of the system, making it usable for interactive tasks. The difference between the structures of these two systems is shown in Figure 4 .
Despite this, while Tor may render difficult the task of determining which sites a user visits, or conversely which users are visiting a site, our requirement of anonymity at the level of individual requests is more difficult. The first and most obvious point is that Tor channels are reused for ten minutes at a time, and therefore client software must demand a new channel for every request in order to prevent them from being linked by IP address. Even so, users must be exceedingly careful if they are to avoid giving information away via fingerprinting of their client software.
Another risk is that information will be leaked via timing attacks; if the requests are made at a fixed time, then the order in which the server receives the requests may allow it to link the requests by the clock error of each user. The time of each request must therefore be randomized, as must the times at which channels are set up. An important topic for future work is therefore to develop an asynchronous alternative to the protocol that we have described.
Client software poses a risk as well-if the service being audited uses HTTPS, it might attempt to fingerprint a user by its available cipher suites, or by the time needed for negotiation to take place.
Tor's use of a long-term guard relay substantially degrades short-term linkability, despite its utility in maintaining anonymity over the long term. Guard relays are stable relays that are selected by the client and then used as the first hop over a period of weeks to months before being changed [23] . If the clients do not use a long-term guard relay, then they become vulnerable to predecessor attacks [24] , in which a malicious relay simply waits until it is selected as the first hop by the client, which it can recognize with traffic analysis.
Our concern is that an attacker will be chosen as a guard with non-negligible probability, effectively guaranteeing that that client will be deceived, and reducing N by one in the previous analysis. To avoid this, the first hop must change with every request, requiring reconfiguration of Tor.
A possibly more secure approach would be to use some kind of protocol that responds to a single fixed datagram packet, however as Tor does not support UDP, this approach would require the use of some other anonymizing network. Nonetheless, with careful design it will be possible to reduce the information leakage to a level that sufficiently masks the source of each request. Connecting to a public keyserver via Tor and via a mix-net. The user randomly selects several relays, then adds a layer of encryption for each relay. After receiving a message, the relays strip their layer of encryption, revealing the address of the next relay. Eventually, the message reaches an exit node, which passes it to the open internet. Anyone can contribute nodes to the network-including adversaries-however as the routing path is selected by the user, an attacker cannot gain access to the encrypted messages with probability better than chance. Mix-nets are composed of a chain of mixes, which take batches of messages, remove a layer of encryption, shuffle the messages, then pass them to a new mix. If at least one mix in the chain is honest, then an attacker cannot connect messages to their senders with probability better than chance.
Another approach is to use auditing servers, as suggested in the CONIKS architecture [15] . This is similar to Tor in many respects, with clients selecting the server from which their traffic will appear to come. The use of dedicated auditing servers has some advantages in that they can sign responses from the server, allowing a degree of undeniability on the part of the service being audited, at least to the extent that the auditing servers are trusted. In addition, the auditing server can cache responses from the service, reducing its load and forcing it to commit to its equivocated response for all subsequent requests made to that auditor. This comes at the cost of new server infrastructure with multiple independent operators, or equivalent changes to existing anonymizing systems; this prevents the technique from being immediately useful, however the security gain achievable by such 'intelligent' systems is a worthy avenue for future work.
Assignment of trust
Given that this protocol requires a trustworthy anonymity system, one might reasonably ask what has been gained from a trust point of view. We avoid the need for a Byzantine consensus protocol, but depend upon systems like Tor whose basic security properties are themselves dependent upon a consensus protocol.
While such infrastructure might be used directly to audit the service in question, as discussed in previous works, this creates a bootstrapping problem. The value of a consensus protocol derives from the fact that users believe that most of participants are honest. The operators of the Tor directory operators are trusted by the community, the directories that they produce are small enough to be wellscrutinized, and the consequences of misbehaviour are large. The result is that Tor is-to most users-more trustworthy than any new auditing mechanism will be.
The protocol that we describe in this paper does not allow us to completely sidestep the need to trust an infrastructure provider, but rather allows trust to be restricted to third parties that have no particular interest in the system in question. This solves the current problem of unavailability of trustworthy participants to emerging systems.
Failure of the anonymity system
Onion routing sacrifices some of the security of mix-networks for low latency [16] . Despite the vulnerability to traffic analysis that results, low latency allows the system to be used for web browsing and other real-time applications, and has driven Tor's wide adoption. Our anonymity system model results in a loose security reduction, the value increasing rapidly with the number of users.
We consider two quite similar cases: a mix-net with a single honest mix whose outputs are surveilled, and the Tor network. In both of these cases, each request is deanonymized with a fixed probability and independently of the other requests.
We calculate as follows: let D be the number of users that have been deanonymized; this is binomially distributed, with distribution Bin (N, p d ) . The attacker has no knowledge of which requests belong to the other users, and must therefore guess them; this is successful with probability (N − D)! −1 . Combining these, we compute the probability of correctly identifying the source of every request:
In the case of a mix-net, deanonymization occurs when a layer of encryption is broken for a message; this allows the content at the input and output of the honest mix to be linked. Arbitrarily setting p d = 2
−80 and N = 10, we obtain ≈ 2 −79 ; this is essentially negligible. Even with 10 4 users, increases to a still-negligible 2 −53 . With Tor, we examine the least favourable case, that where the service in question is malicious. This means that the attacker has knowledge of the anonymized request times and control over the responses. Traffic analysis allows them to deanonymize a request whenever one of their relays is selected by the client for the first hop, thus revealing the client IP address. Suppose that there are N i entry relays, of which C i are compromised or surveilled by the attacker. Then, if relays are chosen uniformly, the attacker can deanonymize a channel with probability p d = C i /N i . In reality, modern versions of Tor do not select relays with uniform probability, but weighted by bandwidth [23] ; this can be accounted for by defining C i and N i to be bandwidths rather than node counts, however [25] does not provide this information for the cabals that they detected.
If we consider a reasonably large cabal of 100 malicious relays out of 7000, for 2 users, Eqn. 39 yields the small but non-negligible = 0.003. This quickly increases to = 2.13 for only 10 users, a substantial loosening of the security bound.
While we are constrained by space from re-deriving all the results above with respect to the properties of Tor, we will derive an equivalent to Theorem 2 for a low-latency onion router, specifically Tor. This demonstrates that control of a moderately-sized cabal of Tor relays does not greatly reduce the security of our initial prototype relative to what we have proven above. Theorem 6. Suppose N users, including Alice and Bob, access a service via an onion router, each of them being deanonymized independently with probability p d during each round. Each user executes the protocol described in Section 2 for M rounds. Then, the probability that Alice will consistently receive the response x and Bob x is bounded as
Proof. For each round, three cases are possible: neither Alice nor Bob are deanonymized, occurring with probability (1 − p d ) 2 , or one is deanonymized, this time with probability 2p d (1 − p d ) , or both are deanonymized, this occurring with probability p 2 d . In the last case, the attacker's success is trivial for that round. The same is true if only one of the pair are deanonymized-we suppose without loss of generality that it is Alice-because the server can respond to Alice with x, and to everyone else with x .
If neither Alice nor Bob have been deanonymized, Theorem 3 applies, with the number of users N a ≥ 2 being that remaining in the anonymity set. The probability of deception is therefore
This occurs with probability 1 − (1 − p d ) 2 , and thus the maximum probability that the attacker succeeds during a given round is
Success in each round is independent, so this occurs M times with probability
Using Theorem 6, this yields a deception probability
From [25, Table 2 ], we see that most malicious relay groups which escape detection for any length of time have less than 100 members. The Tor network, by comparison, has approximately 7000 relays [26] at the time of writing. The effect is to loosen the bound on attacker success from p decep ≤ 0.5
M . This shows that Tor achieves the original N = 2 security bound with an arbitrarily large number of users, and so remains useful despite its poor -values in our more general analysis.
Discussion
We have presented a protocol that uses an anonymizing service to create an auditable broadcast service. This capability is extremely valuable, and can be used in several ways. We have demonstrated how anonymizing networks can be used by individuals in order to distribute their own public keys, but with more and more systems being designed to allow the verification of database entries via a Merkle tree [27, 28, 15] , we must analyze this type of system as well. In this case, many users can be assumed to access the same service simultaneously, and therefore the results from Section 3.4 apply. If more than a handful of users take part then detection is near-certain, even with very few rounds.
The requirement that the holder of an identity takes part is an onerous one, but one that could be met should such a technique become ubiquitous, for example if it is performed automatically by default installations of PGP implementations by all major vendors. Even if this were not the case, the approach still serves to reassure the holder of an identity that other users can communicate securely with them if they choose to take this approach.
The need for multiple rounds makes this approach relatively expensive in terms of communication. This, in addition to the time needed for failure reporting, rules it out in most interactive applications. With systems like CONIKS this is not a problem, as data that is a few minutes out of date will not cause any great harm, since the data being broadcast allows any user to be looked up. When verifying individual keys using the existing PGP keyserver network, the process must be performed separately for each key. This results in an delay before first communication can take place, but subsequent verification can be performed in the background to ensure that the previously-verified key is up to date.
Implementation analysis
Our discussion thus far has been quite general, and we briefly discuss what can be achieved in practice.
The relevant parameters for the system when used to audit keyservers and Merkle Trees is shown in Table 1 .
The first scenario that we consider is the verification of entries on a PGP keyserver. In this case users access keys directly, verifying them on an individual Table 1 . Costs and security of the proposed protocol for literal-data and Merkle Tree systems.
basis. It is necessary to make a trade-off here between the time needed to achieve a reasonable level of verification, and the load placed upon the keyserver.
The requests in this case take the form of search queries for the email address in question. Both the users and the identity holder must agree on the form of these search queries and how the the key is to be selected from the results. In our implementation, the search query is an email address, and the result is taken to be the first valid key listed in the response.
We suppose here that a round will take place every T = 5 minutes; thus after time t, M = t/T rounds will have taken place. Therefore, in order to achieve a maximum failure probability p decep , we require a verification time
If we arbitrarily determine a success probability of 2 −20 to be reasonable-it seems implausible that we could do substantially better by any other means, including in-person verification of identity documents-then verification requires 100 minutes, with server load being inversely proportional to the verification time. This is somewhat inconvenient, but far less so than obtaining a personal certification, which in all likelyhood will require several hours of time in order to coordinate, travel, and perform the verification.
Next we consider the Certificate Transparency system. This requires that a user periodically obtain a Merkle-tree root, with newer roots attesting to previous values as well. We model our system on Chrome's software-update system, supposing that the root will be downloaded at the same time. Chrome checks for software updates every five hours [29] ; if it were to randomize the time of checking during each five-hour interval, then this matches the situation that we have analyzed, with the obvious exception being that Chrome does not currently perform any anonymization.
We make a conservative estimate of Chrome having 100 million active users, though in reality it is most likely several times higher. This time we have T = 5 hours, and from Table 1 we will require t = −T log
log N .
In this case, it is straightforward to obtain a probability of deception of at most 2 −20 -after the second request, the probability that anyone will be deceived without the misbehaviour being detected by at least one browser instance or site owner is 2 −26 , or approximately 1 in 100 million. These waiting times are shown in Figure 5 . 
Time [hours]
100M users 5h interval 2 users 5m interval 60k users 30m interval Fig. 5 . Waiting-time necessary to achieve various levels of security. We show the hypothesized Certificate Transparency system modelled on the Chrome auto-update mechanism (top), our proposed keyserver-auditing system (middle), and our conception of how a keyserver built on something like CONIKS might look (bottom). We see that very small probabilities of equivocation are achieved within only a few hours, such that deanonymization and endpoint compromise quickly become far more likely than chance success by a malicious service.
We reinforce here that this probability is the maximum probability that the service may succeed in deceiving any user. Thus the average number of users deceived is approximately p decep -it is possible, albeit unlikely, that more than one user will be deceived-and not N p decep .
We see, then, that our results are useful in practice and can provide meaningful security against malicious services.
Effects on the Tor network
Our somewhat unusual use of Tor raises the important question of whether the use of Tor in our system poses a risk to other users of the network, or conversely whether it might improve the anonymity provided by Tor. Our need to disable entry guards disabled renders clients using our protocol is rather distinctive, but it is not clear whether this is problematic.
A greater risk from a usability perspective is that misconfigured applications might use our unusually-configured version of Tor for traditional applications, leaving users vulnerable to predecessor attacks. This might be avoided through application-filtering by a local firewall, but safest of all is to use a modified Tor client that enforces some kind of client authentication.
A potential positive effect of this protocol is the enlargement of the anonymity set of Tor users, though this must be balanced against the ease with which an eavesdropper can differentiate between Tor users using our protocol and those using Tor in a more traditional manner. Because the protocol is not highly latency-sensitive, a hypothetical onion router that allows clients to request some delay before the packet is retransmitted might reduce the risk of traffic confirmation attacks to the point that the use of an entry guard can be used, thereby making the use of our protocol far less obvious.
Conclusion
We have shown how an anonymizing service such as Tor can be used to perform multi-path probing, and so create a public broadcast channel that permits clients to bound the probability that the broadcasting service can break consensus with the other clients without detection. Failed attempts to provide different messages to different parties can be proven by the detecting party with the aid of digital signatures. Such a protocol has the potential to provide remote verification of public keys, rendering end-to-end public-key cryptography possible without the need for trust in certificate authorities or for potentially insecure approaches such as trust-on-first-use. We have bounded the probability that an equivocating service will succeed in deceiving its users, and have provided a security reduction to the anonymization-resistance of the underlying anonymization service.
